The authors argue that 'broken windows' policing strategies, promoted officially as a means of reducing crime, though criticised by liberals for the potentially discriminatory impact on non-whites, should rather be viewed as an integral component of the state's attempts to coercively manage the contradictions of capitalism. Taking issue with Wacquant,
In 2013, Detroit's government, on the verge of the largest municipal bankruptcy in US history, paid $600,000 to the Manhattan Institute, a conservative thinktank, and undisclosed fees to the Bratton Group, for their help facilitating the Detroit Police Department's (DPD's) adoption of 'broken windows' 1 strategies. That year also saw the appointment of James Craig as Detroit's new police commissioner. Craig had previously worked under William Bratton when the latter oversaw the Los Angeles Police Department's implementation of broken windows policies. 2 Craig's appointment was largely supported by the local media as a long overdue response to the city's endemic 'crime problem' -a problem that Kevyn Orr, the Emergency Manager appointed by Michigan Governor Rick Snyder in 2013 to administer Detroit's bankruptcy, regarded as a primary obstacle to the city's economic viability. 3 To the extent that the national media paid any critical attention to Craig's appointment and subsequent overhaul of DPD, their reportage fell squarely into the liberal ideological framework. Emblematic is the exposé on DPD's broken windows regime published in Vice magazine, which claimed that 'While the strategy [broken windows] is credited with lowering the city's crime rates, it is also blamed for spawning the "stop-and-frisk" policies that have been criticized for disproportionately targeting and criminalizing minorities … One could argue, as the Guardian did, that this is the result of racial profiling.' 4 This ideological framework -which presents broken windows as an effective but potentially discriminatory and overbearing crime-fighting strategyobscures, and even naturalises, the larger political-economic context in which this police strategy was introduced. By situating DPD's adoption of broken windows in the totality of the city's embroilment in the global economic crisis, a clearer picture emerges: broken windows policing, we argue, has little to do with crime; it is rather part of the state's attempt to coercively manage the contradictions of capitalism.
To understand this more fully, however, we need to look in depth at the political origins of broken windows' most infamous tactic, 'stop-and-frisk'. While stopand-frisk is commonly seen as originating in New York City in the 1990s, the policy was first implemented in the mid-1960s, as the civil rights movement was entering its most radical phase. But we have to cast our net wider, for stop-andfrisk's origins need, in turn, to be situated in the salient points in Detroit's history beginning in the Great Depression and culminating in Detroit's Great Rebellion in 1967, which resulted in the deaths of forty-three people and was, at the time, the largest civil uprising in US history. By analysing the political-economic context in which stop-and-frisk strategies were implemented in Detroit, we show that, from the outset, they were part of an attempt to manage the racialised surplus population, a population which, in the mid-1960s, was violently challenging the hegemony of state power.
Such an analysis runs counter to the theoretical approach of UC Berkeley sociologist Loïc Wacquant, who, in his seminal work on American policing and mass incarceration, Punishing the Poor, writes that: 'It [Punishing the Poor] does not survey efforts to resist, divest, or divert the imprint of the penal state from below which have been variegated if remarkably ineffectual in the United States' because 'the primary targets of penalization in the post-Fordist era have been the precarious fractions of the proletariat concentrated in the tainted districts of dereliction of the dualizing metropolis who, being squeezed by the urgent press of day-today subsistence, have little capacity or care to contest corporate rule.' 5 But we argue that, on the contrary, it is impossible to understand the origins and subsequent hardening of the carceral state unless one fully appreciates the latter's origins as a coercive response to radical struggles against capitalism and the economic dislocations that crystallised in Detroit in the 1960s. Our methodological approach is informed less by Wacquant than Marx, who, in his famous analysis of so-called primitive accumulation in the first volume of Capital, writes that peasants were 'first forcibly expropriated from the soil, driven from their homes, turned into vagabonds, then whipped, branded and tortured by grotesquely terroristic laws into accepting the discipline necessary for the system of wage labor.' 6 Only after this spectacularly violent process takes place, Marx insists, can
The silent compulsion of economic relations [set] the seal on the domination of the capitalist over the worker. Direct extra-economic force is still of course used, but only in exceptional cases. In the ordinary run of things, the worker can be left to the natural laws of production, i.e. it is possible to rely on his dependence on capital, which springs from the conditions of production themselves, and is guaranteed in perpetuity by them.
Following a similar logic, Silvia Federici, in Caliban and the Witch, has persuasively argued that patriarchal capitalism was normalised only after thousands of female rebels were killed during the witch-hunt that accompanied the transition from feudalism. Peter Linebaugh, too, in his classic work The London Hanged, has shown that industrial capitalism in London was normalised only after the spectacular public hanging of dissidents and pilferers at Tyburn. In a similar vein, we argue that before mass incarceration could become normalised in the US, the radical black-led working-class movements in the 1960s and 1970s in cities like Detroit first had to be repressed -and the introduction of tactics that are commonplace in contemporary Detroit, such as stop-and-frisk and paramilitary raids, were integral parts of this repression. 7 By failing to properly engage with the political origins of mass incarceration and broken windows policing strategies, one runs the risk of reifying them as pseudo-natural forms of neoliberal control, just as Marx argued that classical political-economy reifies capitalism as a natural form of social organisation.
But what is the current political-economic context of broken windows policing in post-bankrupt Detroit? DPD's broken windows regime has been characterised by paramilitary police raids in the same peripheral regions of the city that have been most severely affected by the recent foreclosure crisis (which caused more than one-third of Detroit homeowners to lose their homes in the past decade); water shutoffs (which have left more than 70,000 Detroiters without water since 2013); and school closures (three-fifths of the city's public schools have closed in the past twenty-five years).
Concurrently, in rapidly gentrifying greater downtown Detroit, where upwards of $10 billion has been invested in real estate since 2006, DPD has aggressively deployed zero-tolerance, quality-of-life tactics (see for example Figure 1 ). Broken windows policing, we conclude, is a strategy meant to contain, pacify and redirect the city's surplus population, a population that has not only been structurally excluded from the post-Fordist economy, but whose very presence is seen primarily as a threat to the kinds of economic activity which former industrial centres like Detroit increasingly depend on in the neoliberal era of capital hypermobility: tourism, real estate development, luxury consumption and financial speculation. 8 The ideological conflation of the city's poorest people with security threats to be policed by DPD's broken windows regime has hardened into a form of political common sense: in 2016, the city spent $547 per capita on police; that same year, per capita spending on food stamps in Michigan was less than $21. 9 Across the country, the trend is the same. Twenty-one per cent of new arrestees report being homeless on the night prior to their arrest. In Los Angeles, a city which has adopted broken windows, $87 million of the $100 million in the city budget recently devoted to the problem of homelessness was allocated to the police. 10
A brief history of Detroit
The size of the US proletariat increased from 20 million in 1900 to 40 million in 1944. 11 As black workers left the South en masse − fleeing the violence of Jim Crow and having been rendered redundant by agricultural mechanisation − many sought employment in industrial cities like Detroit, where the black population more than doubled in the 1940s. 12 How would these workers be absorbed now that the war was over? It helped that the US came out of the second world war as the leader of the capitalist world system; in the mid-1940s, US-based production accounted for more than half of global production. 13 By 1950, more than 80 per cent of the world's automobiles were produced in the US. 14 But in Detroit, the centre of the auto industry, in 1950 already 22.8 per cent of the city's workingage population was without a job. 15 It is impossible to understand this high unemployment rate without taking into consideration the intensity of the class struggle on the shop-floor during and after the war.
Worker radicalism and corporate racism
Solidarity between the Communist Party and radical black workers helped make Detroit an epicentre for working-class struggles during the war. In early 1944, Detroit workers averaged a dozen strikes per week. 16 And as Detroit's Big 3 (General Motors, Ford and Fiat Chrysler) attempted to collaborate with the United Auto Workers (UAW) leadership to extend the wartime no-strike rule to postwar production, this prompted a massive strike wave. In November 1945, the UAW rank and file launched a 225,000-member strike at General Motors (GM) in Detroit. GM responded by offering a 20 per cent pay increase on condition that the workers cede to the UAW 'responsibility for uninterrupted production'. The workers rejected the deal. This strike was followed by many others and, by 1946, more than 1.5 million workers were striking. This period was, according to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 'the most concentrated period of labor-management strife in the country's history'. 17 The obverse of this multi-racial working-class struggle (and its narrative that big capital was to blame for the city's rampant poverty and brutal working conditions) was intense racist violence (and a narrative which viewed Detroit's social problems as rooted in the influx of black migrants). The Big 3's use of black workers as strike-breakers, among other racist policies, made these firms deeply complicit in stoking the city's racial tension. In early June 1943, 25,000 white workers at Ford's Packard Plant walked off the job in protest at the promotion of three black men. Reporters heard one white worker shout, 'I'd rather see Hitler and Hirohito win than work beside a nigger on the assembly line.' 18 A couple of weeks later, a fight between black and white Detroiters at Belle Isle Park resulted in a city-wide race riot. Governor Kelly declared martial law and 6,000 US troops were summoned to Detroit to enforce a 10 p.m. curfew. 19 All in all, thirty-four people were killed, twenty-five of them black. The police killed seventeen black people, and not a single white person. Eighty-five per cent of the 1,800 people arrested were black. 20 Despite such disparities, the dominant narrative of the riot shifted the blame on to Communists and black Detroiters. The head of Franklin D. Roosevelt's Civil Rights Section said that the 'rioting and looting are outstanding examples of Negro hoodlumism and wanton murder'. The Governor's Committee on the Causes of the Detroit Race Riot blamed the socialist civil rights leader A. Philip Randolph, even though he was nowhere near Michigan at the time, for inspiring in black Detroiters a 'disregard for law, order and judicial process in seeking the racial equality to which they are entitled'. 21 US Attorney-General Biddle advised President Roosevelt to invoke the same war emergency powers used to intern the Japanese to stop black migrants from entering Detroit. 22 Capital's response Capital's response to Detroit's racial violence and worker radicalism was, first and foremost, to flee. 23 Between 1947 and 1958, the Big 3 auto companies built twenty-five new factories in southeast Michigan − none of them in Detroit. 24 The US government subsidised the suburbanisation that facilitated capital flight: the Federal Housing Administration insured new suburban homes; the government funded the construction of suburban schools; and the government built the highways that connected cities and suburbs, often using compulsory purchase to build these highways straight through poor black areas, such as Black Bottom on Detroit's East Side. In the 1950s, while Detroit's black population increased by more than 180,000, its white population decreased by more than 350,000, as the latter made its way into the newly constructed suburbs. 25 The second major response to working-class radicalism was outright repression. In 1945 and 1946, though the war was over, President Truman used wartime authorisation to quash strikes. The US Army and Navy, with the tacit support of the nation's unions, were deployed to seize railroads, mines, oil refineries and factories occupied by striking workers. As President Truman wrote, 'We used the weapons that we had at hand in order to fight a rebellion against the government.' 26 These domestic military operations were a clear precursor to today's paramilitary operations.
The counter-revolution against labour was sanctified in law with the TaftHarley Act of 1947, which outlawed wildcat strikes, boycotts and donations by unions to political campaigns. It also allowed states to pass right-to-work laws which made it illegal for workers to be compelled to join unions and forced union officials to sign affidavits confirming that they had no relationship with the Communist Party. This last aspect of the Act facilitated the mass expulsion of dozens of leftist local unions. Even before this Act, in 1945−1946, the Congress of Industrial Organizations had purged eleven unions with the best track record of promoting the rights of workers of colour; but after the Act, the purges increased dramatically. 27 Black membership in the Communist Party, as high as 600 in Detroit after the second world war, subsequently plummeted, and the number of unionised workers nationwide decreased from 5.2 million in 1945 to 3.7 million in 1950. 28 In 1950, with its power within the union movement secured, Walter Reuther's UAW signed a labour contract with Detroit's big three auto companies − colloquially known as the Treaty of Detroit. In exchange for a no-strike promise and handing over control of the shop-floor, UAW workers were granted pensions, unemployment benefits and annual cost of living increases. The result of the workers' loss of control over working conditions led, among other things, to increasing automation and longer shifts. And so, even as more than 100,000 Detroit workers were without jobs, compulsory overtime became the industry norm as the Treaty was extended into the early 1960s. 29 As James Boggs noted in his 1963 study, The American Revolution, based largely on his experiences working in Detroit factories:
Automation replaces men. This of course is nothing new. What is new is that now, unlike most earlier periods, the displaced men have nowhere to go … with automation coming in when industry has already reached the point that it can supply consumer demand, the question of what to do with the surplus people who are the expendables of automation becomes more and more critical. 30 Due mainly to automation and capital flight, Detroit lost 134,000 manufacturing jobs between 1947 and 1963. 31 Black workers, whose vulnerable structural position in the economy not only forced them to work in the lowest-paid and most dangerous positions, but also made them 'last to be hired, first to be fired', suffered most from declines in manufacturing employment. Black youth occupied the lowest position in the labour market, and their unemployment rate in Detroit was nearly one-third throughout the first half of the 1960s − and this number was 50 per cent for high school dropouts. 32 In this respect, Detroit was no anomaly; across the US, black youth unemployment increased from 16.5 per cent in 1954 to 26.2 per cent in 1965. 33 Criminalisation and dissent The state's primary tactic for dealing with this burgeoning racialised surplus population was aggressive criminalisation. In 1951, Truman signed into law the Boggs Act, which established a two-year mandatory minimum for first-time marijuana possession. Five years later, the Narcotics Control Act increased these mandatory minimums and ratcheted up federal funding for police work that targeted narcotics-related crime. From 1950 to 1965, the number of drug offenders in federal prisons nearly doubled, and from 1945 to 1965, the length of prison sentences for drug offenders also doubled. In Detroit, the Boggs Act had a deeply racialised effect; in the mid-1950s, though blacks made up only 20 per cent of Detroit's population, they constituted 89 per cent of drug arrests. 34 A quick survey of the radical organisations active in Detroit before the Great Rebellion reveals the scope and organisational reach of black radicalism during this time, including, among others, the Shrine of the Black Madonna, Uhuru, Friends of the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee, Group on Advanced Leadership, the Revolutionary Action Movement ('the underground military wing of … Malcolm X's Organization of Afro-American Unity' according to Ahmad Rahman 35 ), the Afro-American Youth Movement, Republic of New Afrika, and the Johnson-Forest Tendency (led by C. L. R. James, author of The Black Jacobins, Raya Dunayevskaya, a former comrade of Leon Trotsky, and James and Grace Lee Boggs). 36 Malcolm X, a former employee at Detroit's LincolnMercury Plant, had an intimate relationship with many among this activist network; it was for this reason that he came to Detroit in 1963 and 1964 to deliver two of his most influential speeches, 'Message to the Grass Roots' and 'The Ballot or the Bullet'.
It was in the context of rampant unemployment, growing working-class radicalism, and urban rebellions around the country, 37 that Mayor Cavanaugh introduced his 'Stop and Frisk Law' in 1965. As the Detroit Free Press reported at the time, this policy gave officers an incredible amount of discretion: 'the law would empower a policeman to stop any person he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a felony or high misdemeanor … it would also allow the policeman to search the person for a dangerous weapon if the policeman "reasonably suspects" he is in danger'. 38 Around the same time, DPD also introduced new Tactical Mobile Units (TMUs), 'an elite corps trained to deal with civil disturbances'. 39 These TMUs aggressively deployed 'stop-and-frisk' tactics in the city's 'high crime' areas − invariably the poorest neighbourhoods on the city's east and west sides. 40 The Detroit Free Press supported these new police strategies and reported that they would allow the government to address 'the worrisome problem of the Negro Crime rate. Negroes constitute 29 percent of Detroit's population. Last year 65 per cent of those prosecuted for major crimes were Negroes.' 41 The Detroit government's attempts to 'police the crisis' and the media's discursive framing of the latter as a problem of black lawlessness were combated on the ground by activist groups. In the summer of 1966, for example, for three consecutive nights, activists and police violently clashed on the city's east side, resulting in fifty-five arrests. Nearly all those arrested were black, including General Baker and Glanton Dowdell, future leaders of the League of Revolutionary Black Workers. 42 Later that year, Detroit activists began emulating Huey Newton's technique of patrolling police officers in their communities. 43 The activists organised black Guards and self-defence groups across Detroit. 'Join the black Guards' slogans could be found throughout the city's east and west sides. 44 The Great Rebellion In late July 1967, these tensions spawned a violent rebellion that lasted for four days and spread across the city. Revolutionary Worker offers a vivid portrait of the uprising:
Those who had been sent to fight for U.S. imperialism in the rice paddies and jungles of Vietnam were turning the guns around. The war had come home. One observer testified that he'd overheard an early walkie-talkie command to spread the disorder to the east side. The authorities in their fear saw things everywhere − some real, some not. The Fire Chief believed that arsonists used divide-and-conquer tactics and that others lured his men into gun ambushes by telephoning bogus reports of fires. A survey of metro-area residents two weeks after the rebellion found that 55.5 percent thought it had been planned, and many were inclined to call it an insurrection or revolution. 45 During this week-long uprising, 7,200 people were arrested, more than double the number in the Watts uprising in Los Angeles in August 1965. 46 A survey of one metro-Detroit prison revealed that 40 per cent of the arrested were employed at Detroit's Big 3 auto companies. 47 Worker absenteeism was so high during the rebellion that factory operations came to a virtual standstill. That this was not a 'race riot', as the media attempted to portray it, but rather a black-led workingclass rebellion, is further evidenced by the fact that most of the snipers captured by state authorities were white auto-industry workers. 48 Days into the uprising, representatives from the Malcolm X Society contacted Mayor Cavanaugh and Governor Romney. As historians Joshua Bloom and Waldo E. Martin document, the representatives said that 'they would bring a cessation of "all hostilities" if the officials would meet a number of key demands, including those for community control over the police, the school board, and urban renewal'. 49 Rather than countenance these political demands, the state increased its repression. As city and state police forces proved unable to definitively repress the uprising during its first few days, President Johnson, invoking the Insurrection Act of 1807, ordered 4,700 Army paratroopers into Detroit. 50 By the end of the week, the military succeeded in quashing the rebellion. In the end, forty-three people were killed, thirty-three of them black, at least twenty-nine of them at the hands of state forces. 51 Post-rebellion: radical activism, stop-and-frisk and SWAT Within a year of the rebellion, two radical organisations emerged in the Motor City: the League of Revolutionary Black Workers (LRBW) and the Detroit chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP). While the former, an explicitly Marxist-Leninist group, organised black industrial workers into an anti-capitalist union, the latter organised the criminalised sectors of the black surplus population, or the 'lumpenproletariat'. Between 1967 and 1971, the activities of these groups coincided with the second-largest strike wave in US history. 52 Kenneth Cockrell, civil rights attorney and LRBW founder, summarised the state's response to the League's attempts to organise workers' strikes as follows:
When Chrysler is attacked … it pushes a buzzer and gets the Hamtramck Police Department. The whole city structure goes into action. At Ford, you are dealing with Dearborn. The fact that we closed down Dodge Main, the basic assembly plant for Chrysler operations in this entire country, means we got a response. We got police. We got injunctions from the courts … They tried to destroy our organization. They tried to kill leaders like General Baker and Chuck Wooten. Most all of the members of our central staff had to go to trial sometime in the year of 1969. 53 In fact, not only the police, but also the UAW, whose dominance within the labour movement was threatened by the LRBW, violently repressed League activities. During a strike at Ford's Mack Avenue plant in the early 1970s, the UAW's 'goon squad', armed with pipes, teamed up with police to break up the strike. A police officer was quoted as telling UAW officials, 'I'm glad we're on the same side.' 54 The state's repression of the BPP is better known. Between 1956 and 1971, COINTELPRO − an FBI programme led by J. Edgar Hoover, who famously stated that 'Negro Youth and moderates must be made to understand that if they succumb to revolutionary teaching, they will be dead revolutionaries' − launched a total of 295 operations, 233 of which, including myriad assassinations, targeted the BPP. 55 As Ahmad Rahman has written, in addition to clandestine operations, Detroit police routinely deployed stop-and-frisk tactics to harass BPP members; to disrupt street sales of their newspaper, the Black Panther; and, as well, to intimidate east-and west-side Detroiters suspected of supporting the BPP. The discretion given to officers by stop-and-frisk policies allowed the Panthers to become, in one member's words, the police's 'punching bags'. 56 In 1970, as the Detroit Free Press reported, paramilitary officers in armoured carriers 'laid siege' to BPP's Detroit headquarters on the city's west side, initiating a 19-hour firefight, ultimately forcing the BPP members to surrender. As Detroit's Judge Ravitz put it at the time, 'this could have been the showdown − a holocaust'. 57 With this violent repression in mind, it is important to emphasise the particular political origins of police 'militarisation', another hallmark of contemporary policing. The militarisation of US police forces did not begin primarily as a domestic form of military Keynesianism, but was rather originally implemented because of the military's superior capacity to repress and contain the urban insurgencies of the 1960s and 1970s. 58 While state repression ultimately contributed to the dissolution of both the LRBW and the BPP, it did not stop capital from fleeing Detroit in search of more docile labour pools: in the decade following Detroit's Great Rebellion, the number of manufacturing jobs in the city decreased by 27 per cent. 59 And as the city's surplus population grew, so did funding for the police forces: across the country, local government spending on police increased from $1.8 billion in 1962 to $8.8 billion in 1977, and spending in Michigan was well above the national average. 60 John Watson, a founder of LRBW, illuminates how the crisis of capitalism was reframed as a crisis of criminality in the poorest sectors of the black working class, and how, in the metro-Detroit area and throughout the US, as white flight from the inner-cities accelerated, the urban crisis became a crisis of black criminality:
There's a lot of confusion amongst white people in this country, amongst white workers in this country, about who the enemy is. The same contradictions of overproduction, the same contradictions of increasing production are prevalent within the white working class, but because of the immense resources of propaganda, publicity … radio, television, journals, magazines, and so on and so forth, which can be drawn upon, white people tend to get a little bit confused about who the enemy is. You take a look at white workers in Flint for instance, in the automobile industry, who are pretty hard pressed because the Buick plant up there is whipping their ass, and it's whipping their ass twice as hard today as it was five years ago, but who do they think the enemy is? The nigger on the street … crime on the streets is the problem. 61
Policing a bankrupt city
Amidst civil unrest, rampant unemployment and population decline, Coleman Young, the city's first ever black mayor, was elected in 1974. While Young integrated the police force and expanded public employment opportunities for the black middle class, he made it clear from the beginning of his tenure that he would support the criminalisation of the swollen surplus population. In his famous inaugural address, he said: 'I issue forward a warning now to all dope pushers, to all ripoff artists, to all muggers: It's time to leave Detroit.' 62 Similarly, two years into Young's tenure, after hundreds of poor black youths descended on a downtown concert, assaulting and stealing from the predominantly white suburban crowd, attacking the concert hall property, leading to forty-seven arrests, Mayor Young dispatched a 'police gang squad' to 'crack down' on youths loitering near downtown, and issued the following statement: 'I want the pimps, prostitutes, gangs and youth rovers off the streets. We're going to rid the city of them -beginning tonight.' 63 Postindustrial Detroit: unemployment, population decline, criminalisation From 1974 to 2013 Detroit, the nation's largest majority-black city, was led by a series of black mayors. As the city's industrial base steadily crumbled and federal aid to cities declined sharply beginning in the Reagan era, each mayor attempted to revitalise Detroit's economy by luring increasingly mobile capital into downtown Detroit. 64 For these attempts to be feasible, Detroit had to be securitised against the latent threat posed by the city's surplus population and each of these mayors waged his own 'war on crime'. 65 The attempts to make Detroit a postindustrial centre of capital accumulation, however, largely failed. 66 Despite lavish incentives − such as, in the mid-1980s, when Coleman Young redirected $130 million in public funds away from community programmes to finance the refurbishment of Chrysler's Jefferson North Assembly Plant − industrial capital left Detroit in search of cheaper land, lower taxes and more docile labour in the global South. By the time Young refurbished Chrysler's plant, the auto industry had become, in William Robinson's words, 'a transnational spider's web … stretching across the globe'. 67 Between 1970 and 2000, the number of transnational corporations (those with headquarters in three or more countries), increased from 7,000 to more than 50,000; firms like the Big 3 shifted the bulk of their productive activity to the global South. 68 By 1990, 50 per cent of the world's financial wealth was open to global investors, and there were simply more propitious outlets available to highly mobile capital than Detroit, with its history of political dissidence, racial violence, and its large, criminalised surplus population. As a result, throughout the latter part of the twentieth century, 20 per cent or more of the buildings downtown − many of them renovated with public funds into luxury business towers and apartments − stood 'empty, or at best thinly occupied'. 69 In 'Anatomy of Detroit's decline', the New York Times portrayed Young's and subsequent mayors' sycophancy towards big capital as proof of political corruption and fiscal profligacy. To frame the issue this way, or to ask whether the black mayors were truly committed to their black voting base, is to obscure the class relations in the city. Race, as Stuart Hall famously wrote, is the modality through which class is lived: this means not only that class relations are racialised, but also that an exclusive focus on race obfuscates class power. Once black politicians took over the political machinery of Detroit, the structural power of transnational capital overdetermined their policy options. With black youth unemployment as high as 67 per cent in the early 1980s, and with the city starved of federal funds, the only way to administer policies that advanced the interests of capital and the black middle class was to treat the city's poorest and least employable residents as security threats. 70 This unleashed a dialectic of unemployment, population decline and criminalisation which defined the peripheral regions of Detroit in the postindustrial era. Between 1950 and 2010, the number of manufacturing jobs in the city decreased more than 90 per cent, from 296,000 to 27,000. During those same years, the city's population more than halved, and the city's white population decreased from more than 1.5 million to around 75,000. With the city's tax base gutted, Detroit's government had to borrow excessively from Wall Street in order to maintain the bare minimum of social services; and as attempts at economic revitalisation failed, Detroit's credit rating worsened and the city could only borrow money at high interest rates, ultimately leading to the city's bankruptcy in 2013. Meanwhile, attempts to police Detroit's spiralling crisis resulted in DPD consistently leading the nation in incidences of police violence. 71 Finally, the aggressive criminalisation of the city's surplus population led, as throughout the US in the era of mass incarceration, to an ever enlarging prison population: the number of state prisoners in Michigan increased from 7,000 in 1967, to 8,630 in 1974, to 14,658 in 1984, to more than 41,000 by 2016. 72 
'Broken windows' policing in greater downtown
This brief historical sketch brings us back to our point of departure, the official introduction of broken windows strategies in Detroit in 2013. DPD's implementation of broken windows strategies has been characterised by two spatially distinct features, consistent with the larger pattern of the city's uneven development: one strategy for the rapidly gentrifying downtown area, another for the Motor City's deeply impoverished east and west sides (see for example Figure 2 ). In greater downtown Detroit, more than $10 billion has been invested since 2006 − for the first time in more than a half-century, capital is flocking to the Motor City, seizing on the rock-bottom real estate prices in Detroit in the wake of the foreclosure crisis. Most of this investment has been done by two billionaires: Dan Gilbert (whose personal net worth exceeds $5 billion) bought at least eighty-five buildings in the downtown area since 2007, and Mike Ilitch (who died in early 2017 with a personal net worth exceeding $6 billion) acquired more than 100 acres of real estate in the downtown area. This investment, and the wave of gentrification it inspired (14,000 whites moved to Detroit between 2010 and 2015, increasing Detroit's white population by 25 per cent), has been jubilantly greeted by the national liberal media. According to The Economist, the 'big question' surrounding Detroit's bankruptcy was whether 'Detroit will manage to become an attractive city again where people want to live, invest, work − and pay taxes'. The recent flurry of investment has apparently answered this question with a resounding yes. 73 Gilbert, whose company Quicken Loans profited handsomely from the foreclosure crisis, was called 'Detroit's New Superhero' by The Atlantic, and a 'missionary' on a 'quest to remake the Motor City' by the New York Times. The Times declared that there is a 'new spirit and promise' in 'Post-Post-Apocalyptic Detroit', and the Washington Post went so far as to declare Detroit the US's greatest turnaround story of the millennium. 74 In addition to such jubilee, however, downtown investment has produced significant cost of living increases. Downtown rents have nearly doubled since 2010, as developers have purchased low-income apartments and converted them into luxury complexes. 75 For example, Triton Investment Company − which, according to its website, has a 'private equity portfolio with combined sales of around €11.5 billion' − has recently opened Water's Edge apartments, 'an upscale apartment community on the Detroit River with a private marina and two private lakes'. 76 The result, as in other gentrifying city centres, has been the dislocation of thousands of poor and working-class Detroiters. 77 In April 2013, for example, low-income residents in over 200 apartment units received a notice 'saying that they had to move out within thirty days'. As these residents were being evicted, two other large downtown apartments were taken over by international developers; the residents of these buildings, who were section 8 (low-income, state assisted) renters, were ordered to vacate the property. 78 In these areas where displacement is rapidly occurring, the problem of homelessness is particularly acute: the majority of the city's estimated 20,000 homeless residents live in the downtown area, and there are only a total of 1,900 beds in the city's homeless shelters − that is, there are enough beds for 9.5 per cent of the city's homeless residents. 79 In greater downtown, DPD's implementation of broken windows tactics has primarily involved a 'quality of life' approach, which entails, above all, securitising the area to facilitate the investment and luxury consumption that has characterised Detroit's gentrification-led revival. Mayor Duggan recently launched a campaign against graffiti, and he also promised to reduce the number of people 'wandering' and 'begging' near downtown. A recent investigation by the American Civil Liberties Union details how he has kept this promise: homeless people in greater downtown are 'being approached and harassed by police, not necessarily for anything they're doing, but just because of the way that they look … Often they're being dropped off late at night in neighborhoods that they don't know. Police often take any money they have out of their pockets and force them to walk back to Detroit, with no guarantee of any safety.' 80 This policy of removing homeless people is fully consistent with the logic of broken windows: as Ruth Wilson Gilmore and Craig Gilmore pointedly observe, this strategy 'aims to remove not only broken windows and graffiti but also the people who are, as Fred Moten puts it, themselves broken windows: those who make others uncomfortable, those who spend too much time in the streets' (see Figure 3) . 81 DPD's targeting of unwanted people loitering near downtown has been justified by the same ideology operative for decades: one which equates the city's poorest residents with criminals. In a 2016 Detroit News article, tellingly titled 'Revival of Detroit's Cass Corridor crowds out criminals', DPD Captain Szilagy was quoted as saying, 'The revitalization of the Cass Corridor has left very little territory for drug dealers … The little that's left has become valuable territory, and that's led to some violence. You have your OGs (original gangsters) who go back to the 1980s, and they're fighting with the younger guys who are trying to move in … This is where these dealers have operated for years, and they want to hold on to it.' Lyke Thompson, Director of Wayne State University's Center for Urban Studies, offered a similar narrative: 'You see development, and when you have a strong foundation of investment, that brings more law enforcement and people who are more likely to report crimes. And the criminals are forced to go elsewhere.' 82 'Broken windows' policing on the periphery Meanwhile, as finance capital and young professionals flock to the greater downtown area, residents of the east and west sides remain structurally excluded from the economy:
Roughly half of the city's population lives west of Woodward Avenue -more than 335,000 people. But across the vast stretch of Detroit, there are only 30,500 jobs -less than one job for every 10 people. Similarly jobs-poor areas abound on the city's east side. That compares to the 64,000 jobs from Midtown to downtown, where just about 18,000 people live (Detroiters hold about 27 percent of the Midtown-downtown jobs). All told, the city has a little more than 200 jobs for every 1,000 people, well below St. Louis' 613, Cleveland's 481 … and Baltimore's 391. 83 Residents of these 'jobs-poor areas' have been subject to a decade of violent dispossession. Neighbourhoods on the city's periphery have been the most significantly impacted by the recent foreclosure crisis: more than 150,000 homeowners have lost their homes to foreclosure since 2006, the clear majority of them on the city's east and west sides. Detroit's government has treated the crisis as an opportunity to solicit investment: rather than instituting policies to help Detroiters retain their homes, the city has sold off vast tracts of tax-foreclosed homes to international speculators in what the New York Times has called 'one of the world's largest real estate auctions'. Detroiters on the city's east and west sides have also been subject to widespread water shutoffs: since 2011, the Detroit government has re-allocated hundreds of millions of dollars from the Water and Sewage Department to repay Wall Street creditors, and has subsequently shut off water services to more than 10 per cent of Detroiters. 84 In 2013, the Detroit government published the Detroit Future City Framework, a 'blueprint for Detroit's future' which the Mayor's chief economic adviser has called his 'Bible'. It advocates reducing services to the city's most impoverished peripheral areas and shifting resources to the gentrifying areas − it is the city's post-bankruptcy austerity programme meant to shift the costs of the city's fiscal crisis onto its poorest residents. 85 It is in this context of economic and political dislocations that we must situate Operation Restore Order, a series of seventeen SWAT-assisted paramilitary operations launched by DPD from 2013−2015, which targeted, for the most part, the poorest neighbourhoods in the city's peripheral regions. The areas targeted by these raids have been otherwise largely neglected by the police: response times to emergency calls on the east and west sides were well below the city-wide average, which Emergency Manager Orr claimed was fifty-eight minutes in 2013. 86 The raids were unilaterally depicted as successes by the local media, and the Detroiters targeted by these raids were depicted as criminals. Crucially, this ideological frame went unquestioned even in the numerous raids where no criminal activity was found. Paradigmatic is a local news report of the operation's final raid on the city's west side in 2015:
Reporter Carlson: The Detroit Police Department is getting good at these organised crackdowns … On this snowy March morning they were at it again, this time hitting this home, which the Chief says was a drug den.
Commissioner Craig: It was an active narcotics location based on what we're finding.
Reporter Carlson: But in this case the suspects got away. Could be [that] the bad guys know this is becoming more common … When the accused drug dealers get home, they'll find a rude awakening, and a casualty.
Commissioner Craig: There was a large-sized pit-bull inside that the SRT officers had to put down. He became aggressive during the entry. They fired two shots.
Reporter Carlson:
This was the seventeenth Operation Restore Order. Every now and then the SWAT vehicle rolls into trouble spots in a show of force. It's to put wrongdoers on notice, and to let residents know the Department means business. 87
Conclusion: incarceration and discretion
With all this in mind, the limitations of the liberal framing of broken windows policing become apparent. Rather than a racially discriminatory crime-fighting strategy, broken windows ought to be viewed as part of a state strategy to manage and contain the racialised surplus population that is structurally excluded from contemporary modes of capital accumulation, as well as normalise ubiquitous economic precariousness by increasing the punishments doled out to those unable or unwilling to accede to the demands of the neoliberal economy. For as William Robinson has shown, the triad of the hypermobility of transnational capital, automation and capital over-accumulation (US-based firms held nearly $2 trillion in uninvested cash in recent years, more than any time in the past halfcentury) makes it increasingly difficult to absorb 'surplus' workers into the capitalist economy. Additionally, the very presence of these surplus workers is often a threat to the kinds of investments which former industrial centres like Detroit increasingly depend on in the neoliberal era: tourism, real estate development, luxury consumption and financial speculation. 88 Across the US, as urban industrial bases declined, the carceral population increased from 780,000 in 1965 to around 7 million in 2010 -and it was largely the racialised surplus population that has been targeted by the carceral state. As Loïc Wacquant has pointed out, by the turn of the millennium, 'fewer than half of the inmates [in US prisons] held a full-time job at the time of their arraignment and two-thirds issue from households with an annual income amounting to less than half of the so-called poverty line'. 89 This regime of mass incarceration could never have been instantiated without consonant policing policies which allow officers, under various pretexts, to target this racialised surplus population.
For Mark Neocleous, the historical origins of the institution and concept of 'police' lie in the development of capitalism: 'the police mandate was to fabricate an order of wage labor and administer the class of poverty'. 90 Crime prevention as such has never been the raison d'être of police; rather, the role of the institution of police in capitalist society is the maintenance of good order, i.e. the smooth functioning of the machinery of accumulation. Disciplining the working classes is of course paramount. And integral to such disciplining and to the maintenance of good commercial order is 'discretion' − essentially, the idea that police officers, though beholden to and enforcing the rule of law, can adjust their tactics to myriad situations. In practice, however, 'discretion' gives police officers carte blanche to act in whatever way they see fit in any circumstance, even to act outside the law; indeed, 'discretion' organises police activity to a far greater extent than 'law', and though officers' actions can be reviewed afterwards, the judiciary almost always sides with law enforcement. 'Discretion', writes Neocleous, 'allows the exercise of power with law standing at arm's length, deferring to the power of administration but using its own symbolic and political significance to confirm that same power.' 91 Discretion is integral to the functioning of broken windows policing. Stop-andfrisk is wholly dependent on an individual officer's perception of the type of person who needs to be stopped and frisked; it allows for the functioning of administrative state power totally detached from 'law', so that even those individuals who do not contravene the law can still be brought into line for existing outside the accumulation process, or who are a threat to it by their presence. Without discretion being fully embedded in the structure of the penal state, there would be no swift and easy means of containing those sectors of the working class whose presence impedes the kind of economic activity necessary for contemporary cities to thrive. Against the popular notion of broken windows as an effective but discriminatory practice that exists within an otherwise just and indifferent judicio-penal apparatus, it should be understood as a continuation of the long history of state power functioning on behalf of capital to impose order on society which dispossesses the majority (in our case the racialised surplus population of postindustrial Detroit) of the means of survival.
